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[Redacted]

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Warning Center

The Director

State Dept. review completed

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12 April 1962



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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12 April 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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suggests persistence of reduced level of trade. (*Page iii*)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 April 1962

DAILY BRIEF

*USSR-Cuba: Moscow's concern over recent developments in Cuba, which culminated in the expulsion of veteran Communist leader Anibal Escalante from the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), was reflected in a Pravda editorial on 11 April--the first authoritative Soviet comment on these events. Pravda reaffirmed Soviet support for the Cuban regime and ridiculed speculation in the West of a split between Castro's 26th of July movement and the pre-revolutionary Cuban Communists. It sought to minimize the significance of Castro's 26 March attack on the Communists' apparent drive to consolidate their power at the expense of Castro's followers by endorsing the removal of Escalante as a "dogmatist and sectarian." At the same time, Pravda issued a veiled warning against any further moves by Castro to curtail the power of the pre-revolutionary Communists or to separate himself from them. It downgraded Castro's role as a revolutionary leader by giving equal status to his movement and the Cuban Communist party in the ORI and by characterizing the formation of the ORI as a new stage in the Cuban revolution which will lead to a monolithic Marxist-Leninist party.

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USSR - Communist China: The prolonged break in the Sino-Soviet trade negotiations for 1962 and the unprecedented Chinese silence on the talks suggest that the reduced level of Sino-Soviet economic relations will persist. In past years the preliminary talks, which this year adjourned in Moscow on 9 March, have usually been followed in less than a week by final negotiations. The delay may have been caused in part by the meeting of China's National People's Congress, which has been in session for the past two weeks.

The Peiping propaganda line in meetings of local political study groups, as late as last month, continued to blame Khrushchev and Soviet withdrawal of assistance for contributing to China's economic difficulties. Recent Soviet announcements on intrabloc trade indicate that in 1962, for the third consecutive

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year, Sino-Soviet trade will decline. According to these announcements, total Sino-Soviet trade for 1962 will amount to less than \$1.1 billion compared with approximately \$1.2 billion last year and more than \$2 billion in the peak year of 1959.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that]

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future]

BERLIN: [The Communists, with prospects of further negotiations, are now avoiding major harassments against Western]

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[access to Berlin. Bloc military activity in general continues to suggest that the Soviets do not expect a military confrontation in the near future]

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SOUTH VIETNAM: [The situation is basically unchanged from that of last week. There has been no essential change in the pattern of Viet Cong and government military operations]

INDONESIA: [Further small-scale clashes with the Dutch are likely and preparations for increasing the scale of operations are continuing.]

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board, on 11 April 1962, approved the following national intelligence estimates:

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SNIE 58-2-62: "Consequences of Certain US Courses in Laos," dated 11 April 1962, classified [redacted]

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SNIE 87.2-62: "The Situation and Prospects in British Guiana," dated 11 April 1962, classified [redacted]

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(Advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24 hours of approval, and the printed text within five days.)

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